Industry strategies for the promotion of E-mobility under alternative policy and economic scenarios by Harrison, G et al.
European Transport
Research Review
Harrison et al. European Transport Research Review  (2018) 10:19 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12544-018-0296-6ORIGINAL PAPER Open AccessIndustry strategies for the promotion of
E-mobility under alternative policy and
economic scenarios
Gillian Harrison1,2* , Jonatan J. Gómez Vilchez1 and Christian Thiel1Abstract
Purpose: In this study, we consider the European electro-mobility market from an industrial perspective, and focus
on effects of market conditions and manufacturer strategies, with the objective to gain insight on what could inhibit
the successful market penetration of electric powertrain vehicles.
Methods: We use the EC-JRC Powertrain Technology Transition Market Agent Model (PTTMAM), a system dynamics
model based around the interactions of conceptual market agent groups in the EU. We assess strategies employed by
automobile manufacturers towards the development and market penetration of electric vehicles.
Results: Impacts on electric powertrain sales shares (up to 2050) related to industrial strategies, represented by
learning effect, marketing effort and R&D funding, are presented under different scenarios related to policy,
regulation and market conditions.
Conclusion: It is concluded from the results presented here that competition between electrical powertrain
options may be more inhibitive than competition against conventional counterparts, with both monetary and
non-monetary industry support for immature powertrains key to their long-term success when supportive policies are
designed to be technology neutral.
Keywords: Electro-mobility, Automobile industry, System dynamics modelling, EU1 Introduction
The 2016 European Strategy for Low Emission Mobility
[1] supports the transition towards low and zero emis-
sion vehicles, building on the aim of the 2011 Transport
White Paper [2] to reduce road transport emissions and
the use of conventional vehicles in cities. It is widely ac-
cepted that electric vehicles (EVs) will form a major part
of achieving the targets set in these documents. Al-
though EVs are not completely without environmental im-
pact, due to upstream greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
and manufacturing processes, studies have suggested that
EVs can have substantially lower overall GHG emissions* Correspondence: drgillianharrison@gmail.com
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifthan conventionally fuelled Internal Combustion Engine
Vehicles (ICEVs) [3, 4]. On that basis, this paper explores
the potential of e-mobility in the European Union (EU).
EVs are already gaining a credible market position in
Europe [5]. However, many factors will affect their long-
term embedment into mobility patterns and preferences.
Given the motivation for the accelerated introduction of
EVs to reduce both global GHG emissions and local air
pollution, governments can encourage take up through
incentivising the purchase of the vehicles to potential EV
owners [6], investing in the development of technology and
infrastructure, or indirectly by regulating emissions with as-
sociated penalties for manufacturers not achieving the de-
sired standards [7, 8]. In this study, we consider the
industrial perspective, and focus on effects of market condi-
tions and manufacturer strategies, with the objective to gain
insight on what could inhibit the successful market pene-
tration of Plug-in Hybrid EV (PHEV), Battery EV (BEV)
and Fuel Cell EV (FCV) (see Table 1 for definitions).is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
Table 1 Key acronyms for powertrains used in this paper
Acronym Term Description
EV Electric Vehicle Any vehicle powered by an electric
powertrain.
PiEV Plug-in Electric Vehicle A vehicle with an electric powertrain
which requires (at least in part)
charging from an external source.
BEV Battery Electric Vehicle A vehicle with an electric powertrain
fully powered by an internal battery
charged from an external source.
PHEV Plug-in Hybrid Electric
Vehicle
A vehicle with an electric powertrain
which can be powered by either an
internal battery charged from an
external source or from an internal
conventionally fuelled combustion
engine.
FCV Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle A vehicle with an electric powertrain
powered by a hydrogen fuel cell.
Table 2 Variables tested by thematic area
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There is already a significant body of work studying
the various policies related to EVs – recent examples
include [9–12]. However, further support to the tran-
sition may be outside the control of authorities, such
as market conditions and the strategies adopted by
the industry.
Modelling the transition of automobile technologies
has long been a subject of research, from studies of car
ownership in the early twentieth century [13, 14]
through the increased interest in vehicle choice from the
late 1970s [15–17] and more recently the impact of zero
tailpipe emission vehicles as part of emission reduction
strategies [18, 19]. However, the number of studies con-
sidering the industrial perspective is currently low in the
English language (see [20–22]). The German automotive
industry has been examined using system dynamics in
various theses published in German [23–25], as has the
Japanese market [26].
Complex real-world systems can be studied with
system dynamics (SD) modelling, which is based on
theory of nonlinear dynamics and feedback control
[27]. Accumulations (stocks) and movement (rates)
within a system of interrelating variables are repre-
sented by simultaneous equations that are repeated
over a period of time, allowing evolution of the out-
puts. Developed by Jay W. Forrester in the 1950s and
applied extensively in business management, it is be-
ing increasingly applied to other disciplines. System
dynamics modelling has long been applied to trans-
port [28] and in particular the uptake of alternative
fuel vehicles [29]. Most previous models have focused
on specific technologies, market agents or regions,
whereas the Powertrain Technology Transition Market
Agent Model (PTTMAM) is one of the most comprehen-
sive models of its type.3 Method
The objective of this study is to investigate the role of
manufacturer strategies in relation to market and policy
conditions. To accomplish this, we employ a system dy-
namics model of transitions in the light duty road trans-
port technology market in the EU, the PTTMAM. Built
around four conceptual groups of market agents (user,
manufacturer, infrastructure provider, authorities) it is
designed to capture the key decision rules, interactions
and feedbacks within the system between 1995 and
2050. It covers all current 28 Member States (MS) of the
Union (EU28) and 16 separate powertrain types. The
model has been described extensively in previous publi-
cations [30–32], and a publically available technical re-
port [33]. Unlike these studies, the focus here is on the
manufacturer, which for simplicity is nominally repre-
sented as one conglomerate within the PTTMAM. Mod-
elling the supply-side as a small set of interacting agents
would yield a more realistic representation of the market
structure under which vehicle manufacturers operate.
However, it would require the linkage with other
methods that may be more suitable for this purpose,
such as agent-based modelling. Therefore competition is
considered not among manufacturers but among power-
train technologies. Initially in the simulation, competi-
tion among powertrains is low and conventional
technologies dominate. Over time, competition among
powertrains is likely to increase, driven by industry strat-
egies as influenced by policy and economic conditions.
To improve the competitive position of a powertrain,
manufacturers are assumed to have three main instru-
ments at their disposal (see Table 2 and section 5.3).
Manufacturers make forecasts of potential future penal-
ties and make adjustments to their strategies in order to
avoid penalties (see Technical Report for full detail on
this). The main mechanism for this is by increasing
Research and Development (R&D) funding in relevant
components in order to accelerate their maturity, but
they can also alter their pricing and marketing strategies
towards lower emission powertrains (to represent com-
petition). This price is calculated endogenously in the
model and includes both fixed and variable costs of the
manufacturer for the production of the vehicle compo-
nents, manufacturer mark up, adjustments for e.g. pen-
alty avoidance, portion of accrued penalties filtering
through to users, and vehicle taxes. Vehicle market
shares are determined through User purchase decisions
made through a choice model based on the perceived
Table 3 Subsidy scenarios





S1 (Base) 2011–13 50% Not available (N/A)
2014–15 25%
S2 2011–13 50% N/A
2014–25 25%
S3 2011–13 50% N/A
2014–50 25%
S4 2011–13 50% 2015–50
2014–15 25%
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butes that develop through time (e.g. performance, emis-
sions, convenience, cost).
It was of interest in this study to look at both push and
pull effects on EV uptake, coming from policy and regula-
tion, market conditions and manufacturer strategies.
In this section we will describe the inputs and scenarios
we have applied. To create scenarios that represent the in-
fluence of policy, manufacturer and economic market
conditions on EV uptake, we have chosen to focus on a
number of variables within the PTTMAM. It is assumed
that EV uptake will be sensitive to all of these variables,
and that increasing them will be beneficial for uptake,
whereas decreasing them would inhibit uptake, relative to
a baseline scenario. In the results section we explore the
impacts of the scenarios on sales market shares of BEV,
PHEV and FCV.
4 Scenario overview
In total, 58 scenarios were tested in this study (see full
list in Appendix), with variables in three thematic areas,
shown in Table 2.
Two levels of fleet emission regulatory targets and four
levels of purchase subsidies were considered, and each
of the economic conditions and manufacturer strategy
variables were tested at a Base value and two extremes.
Whereas the minimum represents a halving of the base-
line values, the maximum entails doubling. As previous
studies identified strong interactions between power-
trains, certain tests were carried out with FCV excluded
to explore the effect of if it never actually enters the
market at larger scale, though it is noted that there are
already some variants on sale in Europe (e.g. Toyota
Mirai and Hyundai ix35). A full list of scenarios is avail-
able in the Appendix, and the scenario inputs are de-
scribed in more detail in the next section.
5 Scenario inputs
5.1 Policy and regulation
Two levels of EU fleet emission regulations were applied.
Base represents the current fleet emission regulation tar-
get in place [7], i.e. only a 95gCO2/km target from 2021.
A second Mid scenario has tighter targets based on [34]:
85gCO2/km in 2025, 75gCO2/km in 2030 and 25gCO2/
km in 2050). Within the PTTMAM, manufacturers are
represented as one conglomerate market agent. The spe-
cific emission target is calculated as per the regulations,
based on average vehicle mass and the target as given.
Average emissions for new vehicles of each powertrain
and size in each MS are calculated endogenously. This is
based on the annual powertrain sales shares of new vehi-
cles, calibrated emission inputs at the start of the time
frame, and the improvement over time is related to the
degree of manufacturer investment in R&D of componentsrelevant to the emissions efficiency (termed ‘environmental
attribute’ in the PTTMAM). Thus, excess emissions are de-
termined from the difference between this and the specific
target emissions, and manufacturers are penalised accord-
ing to the regulations (which is up to €95 per gCO2/km).
In the model purchase subsidies are assumed across
the whole EU and are represented by a reduction in the
cost differential between the alternative powertrain and
the relevant conventional ICEV (see Table 3). The base
values of this (S1) were determined in previous work as
being representative of current subsidy programmes
[31], and for our extended scenarios we continue the
lowest level of subsidy for increasing durations up to
2025 (S2) and 2050 (S3). These are a data input into the
PTTMAM which directly reduces the vehicle nominal
price to the user. In addition to the purchase subsidy
scenarios, a fourth subsidy scenario was created to explore
any additional impact from infrastructure subsidies. This
scenario, S4, includes the base purchase subsidies plus
100% infrastructure subsidies from 2015.
5.2 Economic conditions
Gross domestic product (GDP) and oil price were chosen
as indicators of crucial economic conditions. Both GDP
and oil price influence total sales turnover, therefore these
variables are beyond the direct control of the industry but
could severely impact technology transitions.
Total demand for vehicles at each time step and for
each country is calculated using calibrated parameters,
the initial 1995 demand [35], GDP ratio (the current GDP
per capita relative to the initial GDP per capita [36, 37])
and household ratio (the current number of households
relative to the initial number of households (calculated
from population [36, 38] and household size [36])). In
addition to the total vehicle demand, GDP ratio can also
affect the affordability of a certain powertrain which im-
pacts the willingness to consider [39] and total cost of
ownership of a powertrain, that in turn determine the
powertrain utility and thus sales share of the total de-
mand. Base GDP ratio is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 Base Average EU GDP Ratio (weighted by population and
showing deviation between maximum (Latvia- LV) and minimum
(Germany - DE)
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of the variable ownership costs. In the PTTMAM, the
user choice model of the utilities of the powertrain op-
tions is scaled by a financial attractiveness parameter.
This is the financial performance relative to the average.
Financial performance comprises the total cost of own-
ership and the fraction of the baseline vehicle cost. This
consists of the vehicle purchase price and ownership
costs over a 5 year period (the assumed length of first
time ownership). The user is assumed to only consider a
weighting of 20% of the total cost of ownership in the
purchase decision. Ownership costs include insurance,
depreciation, financing, maintenance, taxes and fuel costs.
Fuel costs are determined from average annual mileage
[40], fuel consumption (reduced from an initial input [41]
relative to investment in components calculated endogen-
ously) and the nominal petrol price (seen in Fig. 2,Fig. 2 German petrol price under base conditions (€/l), showing
maximum (Malta - MT) and minimum (Estonia - EE)illustrative for Germany) derived from current fuel costs
[42], taxes [40] and forecast changes in oil price [36].
5.3 Manufacturer strategies
To represent manufacturer strategies, three further vari-
ables were chosen, which could reasonably be argued
are within the sphere of influence of the manufacturer.
The effect of learning reduces cost of each component
(Electric Drive System, Electric Motor, Batteries, Fuel
Cell System, H2 storage tank, ICE, and Body) over time
in the simulation, based on a base input of 10% learning
rate [31], an initial calibrated component cost (based on
[43]) and relative to the cumulative production of that
component. As all technologies have the same learning
effect less mature technologies will benefit more with a
greater cost reduction curve. The cost of the component
then contributes to the total vehicle price. As well as
cost, the learning effect accelerates the development of
the components, which in turn improve the attributes of
the vehicle that increase overall vehicle utility to the
user. The base effect of learning on cost for each compo-
nent is shown in Table 4. It is assumed that manufac-
turers have a degree of control in the strength of
learning curve by the amount of resources they dedicate
to the component, however in the PTTMAM this is not
explicitly included. We have also further explored the
impact of learning rates on individual powertrains - for
FCV the components H2 storage tank and fuel cell sys-
tem, and for PiEVs the batteries are halved and doubled.
Marketing effort represents the strength of promotion
of a powertrain and feeds into awareness of the user. It
directly influences the environmental importance a user
gives a powertrain in their purchase decision, and
through marketing effect, total social exposure and ul-
timately the willingness to consider a powertrain in their
decision set. It is translated into marketing effect using a
base response (i.e. the growth in awareness resulting
from the base marketing effort) of 25% a year. The baseTable 4 Effect of learning on cost and cumulative manufacturer
spend of individual components under base scenario
Component Learning Effect on Cost Cumulative R&D
spend to 2050 (€B)Base (1995) Minimum (2050)
Electric Drive System 1 0.22 100
BEV Battery 1 0.28 99
HEV Battery 1 0.24 98
PHEV Battery 1 0.27 99




Body Materials 0.20 0.16 300
Fuel Cell System 1 0.54 92
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termined in a base level of forecast sales share of 0.35
that triggers marketing and sensitivity to changes of 1.2.
It is then adjusted according to the degree of extra effort
required to encourage the adoption of lower-emission
powertrains in order to avoid potential emission penal-
ties, as well as in proportion to any subsidies that are
available. Thus the manufacturer is assumed to reduce
marketing of this powertrain.
The R&D share of the funds is the proportion of rev-
enue made available for developing immature powertrain
components. An assumption is made in the model that
5.6% of revenue funds R&D and 75% of this is allocated
to the improvement of these components. The total in-
vestment by 2050 is shown in Table 4, though this is in
relation to a capped amount of estimated spend to full
maturity. The total amount of R&D funds are shared be-
tween powertrains according to their relative future
profits, a measure of the current powertrain maturity
and adjusted to reduce potential future emissions and
avoid regulatory penalties. The component share of theFig. 3 EU 28 BEV sales share to 2050 under Base (top) and Mid (bottom) fltotal powertrain R&D spend is determined as a func-
tion of the remaining potential improvement in the
component, the contribution of the component to
powertrain attributes and the importance of the attri-
butes to the user.
6 Results
6.1 Impacts on EV sales shares
6.1.1 BEV sales share
Figure 3 shows the evolution in BEV sales shares be-
tween 2015 and 2050 under different scenarios. For BEV,
all variables would appear to mainly act in an expected
way up to 2030 under both Base and Mid Targets. There
is little difference in magnitude or market penetration
rates between Base and Mid until shortly before new tar-
gets are imposed in 2025. A small exception to this is re-
duced learning under the Mid target, which has led to
marginally higher shares than either the baseline or
maximum learning rate scenario by 2030. This occurs
because from around 2025 the minimised learning rate
exhibits a more rapid rate of sales growth than othereet emission targets, showing range between Min and Max scenarios
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mature, so learning rates are more beneficial for the less
mature FCV – making it more competitive – thus a
lower learning rate is relatively beneficial for the BEV.
Another anomaly is a higher sales growth rate (com-
pared to baseline) when marketing is stronger at the
start of the simulation, and a lower growth towards the
end. This indicates that strong marketing when the BEV
is first introduced is an important variable, but this boost
is shifted to FCV when it becomes available (see section 6.
1.3). Interestingly, the Base All Max scenario begins to be
more successful than the Mid All Max scenario towards
the end of this time frame.
In the period 2030–2050, greater differences due to
fleet emission targets are more visible than in the initial
2015–2030 period. Perhaps most strikingly, the scenario
with no targets and all variables at maximum have an in-
creased market share of BEV compared to the same sce-
nario with targets in place. This remains the most
successful scenario (in terms of BEV sales share). This
finding alone would suggest that when conditions areFig. 4 EU28 PHEV sales share to 2050 under Base (top) and Mid (bottom) ffavourable towards BEV, fleet emission targets are unim-
portant. The same observation holds (to a lesser extent)
for the marketing and GDP variables. Other anomalies
witnessed are that reduced R&D and Learning effect are
more beneficial for BEV than the maximised counter-
parts or baseline scenarios for the period from 2030.
This is also true to a much more marginal extent from the
about 2045 for marketing. These three manufacturer strat-
egies, when maximised, are therefore more supportive of
FCV than BEV. Under Mid Targets, there is a rapid sales
growth around 2030, which increases even more after
2045. By 2050, the sales are at around the same amount as
the baseline scenario. This again coincides with the intro-
duction of FCV, suggesting that BEV benefits under con-
ditions or strategies that are otherwise unfavourable
towards e-mobility as they affect FCV more.
6.1.2 PHEV sales share
Up to 2030, PHEV exhibits similar, though more suc-
cessful, market penetration to BEV. This can be be seen
by comparing Fig. 4, which depicts PHEV sales shares,leet emission targets, showing range between Min and Max scenarios
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tinct PHEV models available (Petrol and Diesel) whereas
only one exists for BEV. However, there are some key
differences. The marketing variable does not have as
large as an impact on PHEV early in the scenario as it
does on BEV, though is the most influential variable by
2030 under either Base or Mid targets. The scenario
where the GDP has the lowest growth rate leads to
higher sales share than its maximised counterpart or the
baseline scenario. This may indicate that under lower
economic growth, users are less able to purchase the
more expensive BEV. In the early days of an EV market,
the PHEV, which is generally the most accessible EV for
many users (with its lower price, closer characteristics to
conventional vehicles and less reliance on charging infra-
structure), may actually relatively benefit from our as-
sumed e-mobility unfavourable conditions.
Up to 2050, there are greater differences between Base
and Mid Targets for PHEV than for BEV, suggesting
PHEV success is more sensitive to targets being in place
than BEV. However, leading from the observations up toFig. 5 EU28 FCV sales share to 2050 under Base (top) and Mid (bottom) fle2030 and similar to BEV, the All Minimised scenario
continues to lead to a high sales rate and by 2050 is as
successful as the All Max scenario. Thus, conditions and
strategies that are unfavourable towards e-mobility push
sales towards PHEV.
6.1.3 FCV sales share
FCV sales shares are shown in Fig. 5. By 2030, the high-
est FCV market share achieved under any scenario but
the All Max is less than 3%, and the baseline scenario
under Mid targets does not reach 1.5%. Under Base tar-
gets only the Maximised R&D scenario has achieved
more than a 1% sales share. This is because these vari-
ables are more beneficial for PiEV during this period.
R&D has the greatest influence on market uptake of
FCV. This is in contrast to PiEV and indicates that R&D
funding may go preferentially to FCV. Marketing starts
to make a rapid impact towards the end of the time
period, as it shifts preferences towards FCV.
Looking at Base conditions between 2030 and 2050,
there is what could be considered as a failure toet emission targets, showing range between Min and Max scenarios
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2030 there is no growth in FCV sales share under any
scenario without Mid Targets. Thus we can deduce that,
in the confines of this model and our scenarios, manu-
facturer strategies will not support FCV without long-
term, ambitious emission fleet targets in place. There is
a very different story regarding mid-term targets how-
ever. The baseline scenario has a rather rapid sales
growth between 2025 and 2045, which increases further
from 2045 when new targets are visible to manufacturer.
Marketing and R&D funding exhibit similar and ex-
pected patterns of market penetration though marketing
was most influential by the end of the time period.
Learning rates scenarios display similar market uptake
to the baseline scenario but in the opposite way as ex-
pected (lower learning increases share and higher learn-
ing decreases share). The 2030 trend continues because
this variable supports the earlier maturing PiEV over the
lagging FCV technology. Indeed, lower learning rates
have led to one of the most successful FCV sales shares
by 2050. Furthermore, lower GDP and Oil price begin to
produce greater FCV success around this time. The
slowing in sales is due to the fact that from 2035 the
current targets are being met, and no new tighter targets
are visible to the manufacturer – therefore there is no
additional incentivisation for FCV development or mar-
keting that exists under the other variables. These find-
ings suggest that manufacturer strategies are important
for FCV success. This supposition is further supported
by the large bandwidths between Max and Min scenarios
for the manufacturer strategy variables. When all vari-
ables are set to their minimum values FCV experiences
moderate sales growth from about 2035, leading to a
2050 share of around 10% of the market. When all vari-
ables are set to maximum values however, the market
stagnates around 2035 and there is little sales growth
until 2045 when there is a push in FCV by the manufac-
turer in anticipation of the 2050 target. Therefore, even
with targets in place, certain market conditions andFig. 6 Total EV sales share to 2050 with FCV excludedmanufacturing strategies are needed to support FCV
development.
6.2 Testing for the absence of FCVs
Although it is not realistic to exclude BEV or PHEV
from our simulations, because they are already on the
road, as we have identified certain interactions be-
tween powertrains it seemed an interesting venture
to run some selected simulations without FCV. The
impact of excluding FCV on EV market shares under
various conditions is presented in Fig. 6. This meant
for BEV and PHEV marginally higher sales under
Base with maximum conditions. However less than
0.5% of share was added to either BEV or PHEV, as
this “extra” share was split between all available
powertrains. Under Mid targets both PiEVs attained
higher shares (up to around 10%) under every sce-
nario from just after 2025, when FCV would have
made an appearance. However, more interesting than
that is to look at the overall EV shares when FCV is
excluded. Here we see that without FCV, under base-
line scenario and maximum strategies total EV sales
are the same. As the PiEVs do not have to compete
against FCV for marketing, R&D funds or learning,
they mature more quickly. Also, as they do not dir-
ectly compete with FCV for sales, growth is more
rapid.
6.3 Testing for subsidy regimes
Introducing the subsidies of Table 3 (in addition to those
of the S1 baseline scenario), as in Fig. 7, has mixed im-
pacts on total EV share under the varying conditions.
Under base emission targets and variables, the purchase
subsidies S2–3 marginally improve sales. When infra-
structure subsidies are introduced (S4) in addition to
purchase subsidies, this actually results in lower sales
than purchase subsidies alone. This is because the infra-
structure subsidies benefit BEV more than PHEV, so
more BEV sales are occurring, thus reducing the
Fig. 7 EV sales shares under Base and Mid-level emission targets, extreme variables and various subsidy regimes
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When all variables are at their reduced value, the impact
of infrastructure subsidies can be seen as it further re-
duces sales share from baseline. Purchase subsidies can
marginally increase sales, but only after 2040. Finally,
when the values of the variables are doubled, although
the strongest subsidy scenarios results in the strongest
EV sales, it is noted that the actual increase in sales from
subsidies in any scenario is only marginal and may not
be cost effective. Under Mid-Targets, subsidies make
even less impact than under base conditions. This can
be seen in Fig. 8.
The EV trends discussed above generally reflect the
market pentration of BEV and PHEV. As discussed in
previous sections, the FCV market fails under the Base
emission targets. With purchase subsidies in place,
sales can be encouraged between 2025 and 2035, but
then the market stagnates. Infrastructure subsidies
alone (S4) can lead to the best sales outlook, with a
rapid increase from 2035. However, this still only leads
to a 1% sales share by 2050. Nonetheless this shows
the importance of infrastructure support for FCV
under poor conditions. Under Mid emission targets,
FCV is less sensitive to subsidies. Purchase subsidies
barely increase sales, even when the values of the vari-
ables are doubled, and infrastructure subsidies lead toFig. 8 FCV sales shares under Base and Mid-level emission targets and variless sales. This is likely due to the subsidies being
more beneficial for the PiEVs.
7 Limitations
Before concluding on our results, which have been exten-
sively discussed in the previous section, it is worth empha-
sising the limitations of this research. There have been
restrictions to what we could consider and implement due
to the structure of the model employed. As such, our rec-
ommendations are a base for further study rather than a list
of definitive actions. The main limitation of this study is the
representation of the manufacturer agent as a conglomerate
without competing manufacturers. This prevents us from
analysing lock-in effects once a certain manufacturer has
decided to invest heavily in a given technology. Thies et al.
[21] considered this for two manufacturers. Further work
could revolve around explicitly modelling competition
among more than two manufacturers. Secondly, we have
not considered in detail the wider impact on air pollution
and GHG emissions that the introduction of new electric
powertrain technologies may have should they become
widespread. This may dependen on many factors, mainly
upstream emissions, resource sources, power grid implica-
tions and the opportunity for energy storage from batteries.
Nor have we explicitly considered any other externalities of
sustainability concerns of EVs (e.g. resource depletion,ous subsidy regimes (inset – Base on smaller scale)
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is the conservative approach to user choice modelling that
is currently employed in the PTTMAM. We recognise the
sophistication of the automobile market and purchase pref-
erences and this has already been identified as an area of
ongoing improvement and will be addressed in future work.
Similarly, our model pre-dates the changing attitude to-
wards diesel fuel due to its high NOx emissions and ob-
served related accelerated shift towards EVs. Such changing
preferences will be incorporated into future model develop-
ments. Finally, we appreciate that with such a long-term
time horizon to 2050, that there exists many other uncer-
tainties both in the political-economic future of the EU and
within the structure of the transport system, through the
introduction of new technologies (e.g. autonomous, smart
and connected vehicles) and a possible move towards a
sharing economy and mobility-as-a-service (MAAS). How-
ever, all research has its boundaries and these limitations
do not invalidate our findings, merely contextualise them.8 Discussion and conclusion
The motivation of this research was to gain further
understanding on factors which could support or
suppress the introduction of electric powertrains, in
order to suggest positive strategies that could be
considered by automobile manufacturers. The sce-
narios chosen in this research represented a variety
of factors that could influence manufacturer strat-
egies for electrifying their fleet. Fleet emission regu-
lations and vehicle purchase subsidies are already in
place across Europe, so formed the basis of a policy
background to the results. Two indicators of eco-
nomic conditions, growth in GDP and oil price, were
employed to present the influences within a possible
range should the base trajectory not be realised.
Strategies are thus characterised by the strength of
the learning rate (representing the devotion of non-
monetary resources a manufacturer commits to im-
proving a powertrain, assumed to be proportional to
their commitment to the transition), the amount of
R&D funds allocated to improving a powertrain, and
the strength of marketing effort put into promoting
powertrains. The impacts of the manufacturer strat-
egies and market conditions on EV market shares
were presented and discussed. The key observations
with regards to industry strategies are:
 Under maximised manufacturer strategy variables
and the most favourable economic market condition
scenarios, FCV benefits the most of the of the
powertrains considered;
 Manufacturer strategies are more crucial for FCV
than for PiEV success; Strong marketing when both BEV and FCV are
introduced is important for the success of both
powertrains;
 A lower learning rate benefits BEV, as high learning
rates benefit the competing FCV.
These observations are complemented by a series of
findings related to the wider policy and economic
conditions:
 FCVs may not experience market success in the
absence of fleet emission regulations or if PiEVs gain
early success (for which economic conditions have a
notable influence);
 Differing subsidy regimes, for both purchase and
infrastructure, resulted in marginal change in overall
EV share, but impact individual EV shares;
 PHEV is the least affected powertrain by either of
the offered subsidies.
In terms of policy recommendations, the following can
be offered:
 Manufacturers must pay close attention to GDP and
oil price conditions despite any of the three
strategies examined;
 Greater policy focus is required on the market
interaction between PiEVs and FCVs rather than only
the competition between EVs and conventional
vehicles;
 Fleet emission targets are less important when GDP
and oil price conditions are otherwise favourable
towards e-mobility;
 Long-term purchase subsidies are important when
economic conditions and manufacturer strategies
are unfavourable towards e-mobility;
 If the policy goal is to promote FCVs, subsidising
the deployment of hydrogen infrastructure has a
greater leverage than purchase subsidies.
In conclusion, although technology-neutral policies may
be desirable as they do not allow the “cherry-picking” of
available technologies, they may inadvertently lead to the
suppression of the less mature technologies. Strong mar-
keting is highly influential on uptake at the initial intro-
duction of a new technology, and as this initial uptake
determines later success it should be carefully planned for
each technology. Manufacturer commitments to new
technologies, both monetary and non-monetary, have dif-
ferent influences on the development and maturity of
powertrains and so merit further investigation, alongside
adoption of future focused strategies that may capitalise
on changing attitudes towards mobility, technology and
environmental impacts.
1 Appendix
Table 5 Scenarios used in this research
Scenario Policy & Regulation Economic Conditions Manufacturer Strategies Excluded
PowertrainsEmission Regulation Subsidies GDP ratio Oil Price Learning Rate (LR) Marketing effort R&D Share
Base Base Base (S1) Base Base Base Base Base None
Base S2 Base S2 Base Base Base Base Base None
Base S3 Base S3 Base Base Base Base Base None
Base S4 Base S4 Base Base Base Base Base None
Base XFCV Base Base (S1) Base Base Base Base Base FCV
Base All Min Base Base (S1) Min Min Min Min Min None
Base All Min S2 Base S2 Min Min Min Min Min None
Base All Min S3 Base S3 Min Min Min Min Min None
Base All Min S4 Base S4 Min Min Min Min Min None
Base All Min XFCV Base Base (S1) Min Min Min Min Min FCV
Base All Max Base Base (S1) Max Max Max Max Max None
Base All Max S2 Base S2 Max Max Max Max Max None
Base All Max S3 Base S3 Max Max Max Max Max None
Base All Max S4 Base S4 Max Max Max Max Max None
Base All Max XFCV Base Base (S1) Max Max Max Max Max FCV
Base GDP Min Base Base (S1) Min Base Base Base Base None
Base GDP Max Base Base (S1) Max Base Base Base Base None
Base OIL Min Base Base (S1) Base Min Base Base Base None
Base OIL Max Base Base (S1) Base Max Base Base Base None
Base LR Min Base Base (S1) Base Base Min Base Base None
Base PiEV LR Min Base Base (S1) Base Base PiEV Min, FCV Base Base Base None
Base FCV LR Min Base Base (S1) Base Base PiEV Base, FCV Min Base Base None
Base LR Max Base Base (S1) Base Base Max Base Base None
Base LR PiEV Max Base Base (S1) Base Base PiEV Max, FCV Base Base Base None
Base LR FCV Max Base Base (S1) Base Base PiEV Base, FCV Max Base Base None
Base MARK Min Base Base (S1) Base Base Base Min Base None
Base MARK Max Base Base (S1) Base Base Base Max Base None
Base R&D Min Base Base (S1) Base Base Base Base Min None
Base R&D Max Base Base (S1) Base Base Base Base Max None
Mid Mid Base (S1) Base Base Base Base Base None
Mid S2 Mid S2 Base Base Base Base Base None
Mid S3 Mid S3 Base Base Base Base Base None
Mid S4 Mid S4 Base Base Base Base Base None
Mid XFCV Mid Base (S1) Base Base Base Base Base FCV
Mid All Min Mid Base (S1) Min Min Min Min Min None
Mid All Min S2 Mid S2 Min Min Min Min Min None
Mid All Min S3 Mid S3 Min Min Min Min Min None
Mid All Min S4 Mid S4 Min Min Min Min Min None
Mid All Min XFCV Mid Base (S1) Min Min Min Min Min FCV
Mid All Max Mid Base (S1) Max Max Max Max Max None
Mid All Max S2 Mid S2 Max Max Max Max Max None
Mid All Max S3 Mid S3 Max Max Max Max Max None
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Table 5 Scenarios used in this research (Continued)
Scenario Policy & Regulation Economic Conditions Manufacturer Strategies Excluded
PowertrainsEmission Regulation Subsidies GDP ratio Oil Price Learning Rate (LR) Marketing effort R&D Share
Mid All Max S4 Mid S4 Max Max Max Max Max None
Mid All Max XFCV Mid Base (S1) Max Max Max Max Max FCV
Mid GDP Min Mid Base (S1) Min Base Base Base Base None
Mid GDP Max Mid Base (S1) Max Base Base Base Base None
Mid OIL Min Mid Base (S1) Base Min Base Base Base None
Mid OIL Max Mid Base (S1) Base Max Base Base Base None
Mid LR Min Mid Base (S1) Base Base Min Base Base None
Mid LR PiEV Min Mid Base (S1) Base Base PiEV Min, FCV Base Base Base None
Mid LR FCV Min Mid Base (S1) Base Base PiEV Base, FCV Min Base Base None
Mid LR Max Mid Base (S1) Base Base Max Base Base None
Mid LR PiEV Max Mid Base (S1) Base Base PiEV Max, FCV Base Base Base None
Mid LR FCV Max Mid Base (S1) Base Base PiEV Base, FCV Max Base Base None
Mid MARK Min Mid Base (S1) Base Base Base Min Base None
Mid MARK Max Mid Base (S1) Base Base Base Max Base None
Mid R&D Min Mid Base (S1) Base Base Base Base Min None
Mid R&D Max Mid Base (S1) Base Base Base Base Max None
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